So…the roster…its architects…the renovation. Any insights from all this? Well, there is a logic that has led to this point. And, it illustrates that the whole draft OR free agency OR trades argument in roster development is missing the point, because it takes no account of two things -- time and development. It requires a combination of tools, even if it is “draft-centric.” Try on this logic...
1. 2004 - Caps begin sell off of overpriced and/or aging assets for picks and/or prospects.
2. 2004 - Caps finish badly, third worst team in league, win ping pong ball contest, draft Alex Ovechkin
3. 2005/2006 - Caps have rookie Ovechkin and not much else (Alexander Semin didn't play that year, Mike Green played only 22 games), a roster made up largely of players who will be long gone when Ovechkin hits his prime. With no "core" to speak of yet, why would the Caps spend a lot of money on free agents or trade? And what would they trade, the picks and prospects they just got by selling off those overpaid/aging assets? Caps finish badly, get top-five pick -- Nicklas Backstrom.
4. 2006/2007 - Caps have Ovechkin, but Backstrom is not yet with team. Semin plays in 77 games, and Green plays in 70 (2-10-12 was his scoring line), so the Caps at least have given a part of their future lots of game experience. But again, Ovechkin, Semin and Green have little experience. Why would you buy free agents and essentially waste the first couple of years on their deals while Ovechkin, Semin, and Green were maturing. And as far as trades go, again...what would you trade away? Think you'd get much for Ben Clymer or Jakub Klepis? So Caps finish badly again, get another high pick -- Karl Alzner.
5. 2007/2008 - With young core adding year of experience, Caps deploy a free agency strategy, adding Tom Poti, Viktor Kozlov, Michael Nylander. Ovechkin has an historic year in making, Backstrom is a Calder candidate, Green puts in claim as one of best offensive defensemen in the league (18-38-56), Semin was a 26-goal scorer in only 63 games. The Young Guns are in place and make a the run at playoffs. Team rewards them by making trades to help with present -- Sergei Fedorov and (ugh!) Matt Cooke. The logic here is that the young core demonstrated an ability to compete for a playoff spot, making an investment in trades advantageous here and now to the Caps, as opposed to previous years when such moves would have been wasted waiting for the core players to develop. Caps make playoffs, indicating that they are now a competitive team, opening up other tools for the front office -- they traded up to get Anton Gustafsson (a dud) and traded a former high draft pick (Steve Eminger) for another first round pick (which became John Carlson). The Caps being competitive, they can implement other roster-building tools to supplement the draft (in this case, trading deadline trades and draft day trades).
6. 2008/2009 - The five players who would ultimately become the core (defined by commitment of dollars/years: Ovechkin, Semin, Green, Backstrom, Laich) are top five scorers on team -- all were drafted or (in case of Laich) obtained as prospect in selloff. Team improves to tie franchise record for wins. Team stands pat, advances to second round.
7. 2009/2010 – The Caps have what amounts to two-thirds of an elite first line with Alex Ovechkin and Nicklas Backstrom. They are sufficiently far along on their development curve that the Caps could invest in a Mike Knuble to supplement that first line with skills and traits it doesn’t have – an ability to eat space in front of the net and do the dirty work from in close to get those “garbage” goals. The team was far enough along to be able to take a chance on a free agency like Brendan Morrison to help shore up the middle on the second line (some things do not turn out quite as planned, as Morrison faded, only two goals and 17 points after Christmas). And, the Caps could once more be active players on the trade market, obtaining Jason Chimera at mid-season, they Eric Belanger, Scott Walker, and Joe Corvo at the deadline.
8. 2010-2011 – Here the draft once more bears fruit, but it is the product of decisions made in previous years. Karl Alzner was a result of those talent-poor teams after the selloff, a fifth overall pick in the 2007 draft. John Carlson was what came of a trade of Steve Eminger to Philadelphia for a first-round draf pick. They served their apprenticeship playing alongside one another at Hershey, and now they were a pairing that would consume lots of minutes with the Caps. So many, and in so many responsible situations that they were as close to a shutdown defensive pair the Caps had. Either of them could make a case for being a potential “core” player in time. And this further development from within could provide the confidence to fill in other holes – trading forward Tomas Fleischmann for stay-at-home defenseman Scott Hannan early in the season, then adding Marco Sturm via waivers, and Jason Arnott and Dennis Wideman via trade at the trading deadline in February.
The chronology of events and the continuity among decision-makers has provided the benefit of stability and patience to build a team in a stepwise fashion – sell off the overpaid and/or aging assets, collect picks and prospects, build a core from that. As the core is assembled and allowed to develop, keep the power dry in terms of executing trades or mid-to-high end free agency signings. When the core has sufficiently matured, at that point the team could begin to add other assets – trades at the trading deadline when the club was in a position to compete for the playoffs, free agents to start filling holes in other areas of the lineup. Finally, with the Caps’ core essentially set and, perhaps more important, largely a body of assets to which the club has committed money and years, attention could be focused more on the other parts of the roster. The club could make a trade for a Dennis Wideman who was more than a rental, but had time and money left on his deal that would provide another year’s worth of stability to work with the core. The club could invest during this off season in free agents like Tomas Vokoun, Roman Hamrlik, Joel Ward, or Jeff Halpern.
It is not an abandonment of the draft-centric philosophy the club adopted when the selloff was undertaken. In fact, it is precisely because the Caps built a core almost entirely from the draft, then committed money and contract years to it that allowed them to fill other roles by other means. Since the Caps became a playoff-competitive team in the 2007-2008 season, this has meant letting the core develop into their prime and performing periodic “renovations” as a means to build around it.
The flip side of this, though, is that the Caps are committed to that core – at least to Alex Ovechkin (through 2021), Nicklas Backstrom (2020) and Brooks Laich (2017). Whether Mike Green and Alexander Semin, two players of the original “Young Guns” (who have themselves been given previous commitments in dollars and/or years) retain their place in that group might very well depend on their performance in the 2011-2012 season (Green will be a restricted free agent at year’s end; Semin will be an unrestricted free agent). That will be one of the interesting subplots to the season.
But as far as the “renovation” part of the rebuild is concerned, the Caps are now at that part of the rebuild where a point we made on other occasions steps to the forefront. And that is, it is not in drafting a generational talent like Alex Ovechkin that success is achieved or not, it is in the team that is built around him – the renovations around Ovechkin and the core. Having built that team, one could reasonably argue that now the duty to perform rests on the shoulders of the players and the coaches. But whether players like Joel Ward, Jeff Halpern, Roman Hamrlik, and Tomas Vokoun are the right players to build around Ovechkin and the core in their quest for a championship will speak to the skill and judgment of the architects of the rebuild, too.
Put another way, there really are no more excuses. If not now, when?
Showing posts with label the rebuild...renovation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label the rebuild...renovation. Show all posts
Wednesday, July 27, 2011
Tuesday, July 26, 2011
The Rebuild...Renovation, Part III
Well, we covered the roster in the first two installments of the “renovation” phase of the rebuild, but there is also the matter of the architects and overseers of this phase of the rebuild. And since the rebuild began in earnest in 2004, the one thing that characterizes this element of the club is “continuity.” Draw a line from ownership to the general manager to scouting to the bench, and there isn’t much in the way of turnover.
Looking at hockey operations, the men in charge have been the men in charge, almost without exception, since the selloff. George McPhee and Ross Mahoney have been in their respective positions since well before the selloff – McPhee having finished his 14th year as general manager and Mahoney his 13th as director of amateur scouting. And drilling a bit further, Brian MacLellan just finished his 10th season as Assistant GM/Director of Player Personnel, and Don Fishman just finished his sixth season as AssistantGM/Director of Legal Affairs and the club’s “capologist.” Team ownership cannot be accused of capriciousness with respect to front office personnel.
It hasn’t been all that much different behind the bench. After Bruce Cassidy was relieved of his duties as head coach in December 2003 in favor of Glen Hanlon, the Caps would go another four years before making another change – Bruce Boudreau replacing Hanlon – the only head coaching change since the selloff began in earnest. Even down the line, the Caps have had four bench assistant coaches over the seven years since the tail end of the 2003-2004 season. Just as continuity has characterized front office operations, the same might be said of the on-ice management of the club.
So what do we have for this stability? Well, looking at the transaction listing in the 2010-2011 Caps Media Guide and the transaction listing at ESPN for the 2010-2011 season, the Caps have made approximately 120 transactions involving acquisition of players since the trade that sent Steve Konowalchuk and a draft pick to the Colorado Avalanche for Bates Battaglia and Jonas Johansson in October 2003 that might serve as the starting point for the selloff.* In all, 42 trades, nine waiver claims, and 70 or so other deals involving free agents or signing draft picks to entry contracts. A total of 128 players wore a Caps uniform from the 2003-2004 season through the 2010-2011 season. Some of those players were those who were sold off when the Caps embarked on their rebuild – Konowalchuk, Sergei Gonchar, Peter Bondra, Jaromir Jagr, for example. Others were, for lack of a more delicate term, fodder to feed the schedule – players who filled out the roster in the woebegone 2003-2004 season or those who encumbered a roster spot as the stars-to-be were learning their craft, but whose modest skill levels ensured that they would not be around when those young stars were ready for prime time.
In that sense, the Caps tore out the walls, the wiring, the plumbing… everything down to the studs in the 2003-2004 season. Then they lived modestly while the parts were assembled over the first three seasons after the lockout (even the 2007-2008 playoff run might be thought of as a pleasant surprise, given where the Caps started that season).
The constant was management, the only big change being when it became evident that Glen Hanlon was not the right fit for where the Caps were on their development curve and for the talent the Caps had developing for the core of their roster, which leaned more heavily toward the skill aspects of the game. The stability in the front office became reflected on the roster in terms of a slightly lower frequency of transactions. Until the Caps made a series trading deadline deals in 2008 to bolster the roster for their first playoff run since the lockout, the Caps made 68 transactions by our count (according to the Caps Media Guide) involving the acquisition of players over the 50 months since the Konowalchuk-to-Colorado trade in December of 2003. Since then, however, the Caps have had only 54 transactions over the 41 months since those February 2008 trading deadline deals.
The trades since the 2008 deadline deals are especially interesting:
June 20, 2008 Caps acquired a 1st round pick in the 2008 Entry Draft (John Carlson) from Philadelphia for Steve Eminger and a 3rd round pick in the 2008 Entry Draft (Jacob Deserres).
June 27, 2009 Caps acquired a 5th round pick in the 2010 Entry Draft for Sami Lepisto.
July 17, 2009 Caps traded Keith Seabrook to Calgary for future considerations.
Dec. 28, 2009 Caps acquired Jason Chimera from Columbus for Chris Clark and Milan Jurcina.
March 3, 2010 Caps acquired Scott Walker from Carolina for a 7th round pick in the 2010 Entry Draft (later traded to Philadelphia, Ricard Blidstrand).
March 3, 2010 Caps acquired Eric Belanger from Minnesota for a 2nd round pick in the 2010 Entry Draft (Johan Larsson).
March 3, 2010 Caps acquired Milan Jurcina from Columbus for a conditional draft pick.
March 3, 2010 Caps acquired Joe Corvo from Carolina for Brian Pothier, Oskar Osala and a 2nd round pick in the 2011 Entry Draft.
July 28, 2010 Caps acquired D.J. King from St. Louis for Stefan Della Rovere
November 30, 2010 Traded F Tomas Fleischmann to Colorado for D Scott Hannan
February 26, 2011 Acquired D Dennis Wideman from Florida for C Jake Hauswirth and a 2011 third-round pick.
February 26, 2011 Acquired Jason Arnott from New Jersey for David Steckel and a 2012 second round draft pick
June 2, 2011 Acquired LW Taylor Stefishen from the Nashville Predators for a conditional pick in the 2013 draft.
June 24, 2011 Acquired Troy Brouwer from the Chicago Blackhawks for a 2011 first round draft pick
July 1, 2011 Traded G Semyon Varlamov to Colorado for a 2012 first-round draft pick and a 2012 or 2013 second-round draft pick.
In all, 15 trades on this list, none of which can be seen as of the “blockbuster” variety. Which is not to say that there are not some real bargains in that list. The 2008 trade that netted a draft pick that would become John Carlson might not have looked like a lot at the time, but given that Carlson might be an anchor defenseman for a decade, and Philadelphia would eventually trade Eminger with Steve Downie and a draft pick for Matt Carle and a draft pick, and it seems like a real bargain (we’ll leave it to you to decide if John Carlson or Matt Carle is going to have the better career). What is telling here is that while the trades were not of the "blockbuster" variety, it would be hard to argue that the Caps came out on the low end of any of them. Some might not have worked out as intended (the Corvo trade or the King trade, for example), but you can't say the Caps were "taken" in any of them.
On the other hand, getting Dennis Wideman for a prospect and a pick solidified the Caps’ blue line and helped the power play some until Wideman’s season was ended by injury. And, he will be back for the 2011-2012 season. Trading an oft-injured goaltender for a first and second round draft pick provides no guarantees, but given how the Caps have drafted since the lockout, provides some cause for optimism about futures.
But the trades, for the most part, were for players to fill roles in the support group. They were not trades to establish core players. The Caps chose a different path to fill those core roles, and it has been adhered to patiently. So, for fans wishing and hoping for the Caps to make that “really big deal”… keep waiting. It just is not how the architects of the roster do business.
And this paints a bigger picture. The “rebuild,” such as it was, was limited to the ice – players and to a limited extent behind the bench. The architects and overseers have been firmly in place to manage the effort since its inception. As far as the on-ice product is concerned, the Caps have parlayed this strategy into reliable contention for a playoff spot. Four consecutive years of post-season play, and since Bruce Boudreau took over behind the bench a regular season record of 189-79-39 in 307 games.
But that success has not carried over into the post-season, where the Caps are 2-4 in six playoff series and a games record of 17-20. The frustration at this level is merely the latest instance of frustration that dates back to the first Caps playoff appearance in 1983 – 36 seasons, 22 playoff appearances, and only twice advancing past the second round. And a fan might reasonably wonder if making the playoffs is good enough for this administration.
Getting to that level – playoff qualifier – has had a considerable element of luck involved in it (the bounce of a ping pong ball allowing the Caps to draft Alex Ovechkin) and acceptance of failure (a selloff that produced picks and prospects, but also a bad team that resulted in high picks that netted Nicklas Backstrom and Karl Alzner). There has been some astute personnel management, to be sure – late first round picks such as Mike Green or Jeff Schultz, savvy horse trading that netted a pick that turned into John Carlson. Taken together though, if “playoffs” is the summit of achievement for this team, they would be little different from the 1979-2004 St. Louis Blues (25 consecutive years in the playoffs, twice advancing past the second round) or the 1983-1996 Capitals (14 consecutive playoff appearances, once advancing past the second round) -- very good teams, but not memorable. And then the question will not be whether The Plan was “right,” but whether it was done “well.”
* This does not include transactions involving re-signing of roster players to new contracts.
Looking at hockey operations, the men in charge have been the men in charge, almost without exception, since the selloff. George McPhee and Ross Mahoney have been in their respective positions since well before the selloff – McPhee having finished his 14th year as general manager and Mahoney his 13th as director of amateur scouting. And drilling a bit further, Brian MacLellan just finished his 10th season as Assistant GM/Director of Player Personnel, and Don Fishman just finished his sixth season as AssistantGM/Director of Legal Affairs and the club’s “capologist.” Team ownership cannot be accused of capriciousness with respect to front office personnel.
It hasn’t been all that much different behind the bench. After Bruce Cassidy was relieved of his duties as head coach in December 2003 in favor of Glen Hanlon, the Caps would go another four years before making another change – Bruce Boudreau replacing Hanlon – the only head coaching change since the selloff began in earnest. Even down the line, the Caps have had four bench assistant coaches over the seven years since the tail end of the 2003-2004 season. Just as continuity has characterized front office operations, the same might be said of the on-ice management of the club.
So what do we have for this stability? Well, looking at the transaction listing in the 2010-2011 Caps Media Guide and the transaction listing at ESPN for the 2010-2011 season, the Caps have made approximately 120 transactions involving acquisition of players since the trade that sent Steve Konowalchuk and a draft pick to the Colorado Avalanche for Bates Battaglia and Jonas Johansson in October 2003 that might serve as the starting point for the selloff.* In all, 42 trades, nine waiver claims, and 70 or so other deals involving free agents or signing draft picks to entry contracts. A total of 128 players wore a Caps uniform from the 2003-2004 season through the 2010-2011 season. Some of those players were those who were sold off when the Caps embarked on their rebuild – Konowalchuk, Sergei Gonchar, Peter Bondra, Jaromir Jagr, for example. Others were, for lack of a more delicate term, fodder to feed the schedule – players who filled out the roster in the woebegone 2003-2004 season or those who encumbered a roster spot as the stars-to-be were learning their craft, but whose modest skill levels ensured that they would not be around when those young stars were ready for prime time.
In that sense, the Caps tore out the walls, the wiring, the plumbing… everything down to the studs in the 2003-2004 season. Then they lived modestly while the parts were assembled over the first three seasons after the lockout (even the 2007-2008 playoff run might be thought of as a pleasant surprise, given where the Caps started that season).
The constant was management, the only big change being when it became evident that Glen Hanlon was not the right fit for where the Caps were on their development curve and for the talent the Caps had developing for the core of their roster, which leaned more heavily toward the skill aspects of the game. The stability in the front office became reflected on the roster in terms of a slightly lower frequency of transactions. Until the Caps made a series trading deadline deals in 2008 to bolster the roster for their first playoff run since the lockout, the Caps made 68 transactions by our count (according to the Caps Media Guide) involving the acquisition of players over the 50 months since the Konowalchuk-to-Colorado trade in December of 2003. Since then, however, the Caps have had only 54 transactions over the 41 months since those February 2008 trading deadline deals.
The trades since the 2008 deadline deals are especially interesting:
June 20, 2008 Caps acquired a 1st round pick in the 2008 Entry Draft (John Carlson) from Philadelphia for Steve Eminger and a 3rd round pick in the 2008 Entry Draft (Jacob Deserres).
June 27, 2009 Caps acquired a 5th round pick in the 2010 Entry Draft for Sami Lepisto.
July 17, 2009 Caps traded Keith Seabrook to Calgary for future considerations.
Dec. 28, 2009 Caps acquired Jason Chimera from Columbus for Chris Clark and Milan Jurcina.
March 3, 2010 Caps acquired Scott Walker from Carolina for a 7th round pick in the 2010 Entry Draft (later traded to Philadelphia, Ricard Blidstrand).
March 3, 2010 Caps acquired Eric Belanger from Minnesota for a 2nd round pick in the 2010 Entry Draft (Johan Larsson).
March 3, 2010 Caps acquired Milan Jurcina from Columbus for a conditional draft pick.
March 3, 2010 Caps acquired Joe Corvo from Carolina for Brian Pothier, Oskar Osala and a 2nd round pick in the 2011 Entry Draft.
July 28, 2010 Caps acquired D.J. King from St. Louis for Stefan Della Rovere
November 30, 2010 Traded F Tomas Fleischmann to Colorado for D Scott Hannan
February 26, 2011 Acquired D Dennis Wideman from Florida for C Jake Hauswirth and a 2011 third-round pick.
February 26, 2011 Acquired Jason Arnott from New Jersey for David Steckel and a 2012 second round draft pick
June 2, 2011 Acquired LW Taylor Stefishen from the Nashville Predators for a conditional pick in the 2013 draft.
June 24, 2011 Acquired Troy Brouwer from the Chicago Blackhawks for a 2011 first round draft pick
July 1, 2011 Traded G Semyon Varlamov to Colorado for a 2012 first-round draft pick and a 2012 or 2013 second-round draft pick.
In all, 15 trades on this list, none of which can be seen as of the “blockbuster” variety. Which is not to say that there are not some real bargains in that list. The 2008 trade that netted a draft pick that would become John Carlson might not have looked like a lot at the time, but given that Carlson might be an anchor defenseman for a decade, and Philadelphia would eventually trade Eminger with Steve Downie and a draft pick for Matt Carle and a draft pick, and it seems like a real bargain (we’ll leave it to you to decide if John Carlson or Matt Carle is going to have the better career). What is telling here is that while the trades were not of the "blockbuster" variety, it would be hard to argue that the Caps came out on the low end of any of them. Some might not have worked out as intended (the Corvo trade or the King trade, for example), but you can't say the Caps were "taken" in any of them.
On the other hand, getting Dennis Wideman for a prospect and a pick solidified the Caps’ blue line and helped the power play some until Wideman’s season was ended by injury. And, he will be back for the 2011-2012 season. Trading an oft-injured goaltender for a first and second round draft pick provides no guarantees, but given how the Caps have drafted since the lockout, provides some cause for optimism about futures.
But the trades, for the most part, were for players to fill roles in the support group. They were not trades to establish core players. The Caps chose a different path to fill those core roles, and it has been adhered to patiently. So, for fans wishing and hoping for the Caps to make that “really big deal”… keep waiting. It just is not how the architects of the roster do business.
And this paints a bigger picture. The “rebuild,” such as it was, was limited to the ice – players and to a limited extent behind the bench. The architects and overseers have been firmly in place to manage the effort since its inception. As far as the on-ice product is concerned, the Caps have parlayed this strategy into reliable contention for a playoff spot. Four consecutive years of post-season play, and since Bruce Boudreau took over behind the bench a regular season record of 189-79-39 in 307 games.
But that success has not carried over into the post-season, where the Caps are 2-4 in six playoff series and a games record of 17-20. The frustration at this level is merely the latest instance of frustration that dates back to the first Caps playoff appearance in 1983 – 36 seasons, 22 playoff appearances, and only twice advancing past the second round. And a fan might reasonably wonder if making the playoffs is good enough for this administration.
Getting to that level – playoff qualifier – has had a considerable element of luck involved in it (the bounce of a ping pong ball allowing the Caps to draft Alex Ovechkin) and acceptance of failure (a selloff that produced picks and prospects, but also a bad team that resulted in high picks that netted Nicklas Backstrom and Karl Alzner). There has been some astute personnel management, to be sure – late first round picks such as Mike Green or Jeff Schultz, savvy horse trading that netted a pick that turned into John Carlson. Taken together though, if “playoffs” is the summit of achievement for this team, they would be little different from the 1979-2004 St. Louis Blues (25 consecutive years in the playoffs, twice advancing past the second round) or the 1983-1996 Capitals (14 consecutive playoff appearances, once advancing past the second round) -- very good teams, but not memorable. And then the question will not be whether The Plan was “right,” but whether it was done “well.”
* This does not include transactions involving re-signing of roster players to new contracts.
Thursday, July 21, 2011
The Rebuild...Renovation, Part II
In the last post, we looked at the current state of the “rebuild” and the elements that make up what we might consider to be the “core” of the roster and how it evolved over time. Now it is time to take a look at the players outside this core group, the ones that constitute the support group. Let’s go back to that roster table we posted last time:
Looking at that table above, we can see that there is much more turnover within that group over time. No player shows up in more than two instances of the four time markers we identified. And if you look at the changes from the last game of the 2008 playoffs to today, every spot has been recycled to another player (although one – Brooks Laich – graduated to the core). And in that new group we find today, notice that three of the 13 players came by way of Hershey – Jay Beagle, Jeff Schultz, and Michal Neuvirth. The flip side of that is that nine arrived from other organizations, either by trade (Brouwer, Chimera, Wideman) or by free agency/waivers (Knuble, Ward, Halpern, Hendricks, Hamrlik, Vokoun). Only Marcus Johansson (who someday might be a “core” player) was drafted and did not spend time in North American minor pro leagues.
And it is that imported group that is the more interesting group. Because, in a perverse way, it further supports the notion that the core is built and finished. Over the past four years, the Caps have not done much by way of off-season dealing to fill in behind the core. If you look at that 2008 playoff roster, only Viktor Kozlov, Tom Poti and Donald Brashear were brought in during an off-season (Michael Nylander would be added to that list had he been healthy for that playoff series). Others – Sergei Fedorov, Matt Cooke – were trading deadline deals. They were rentals to whom little financial or time commitment was given (Fedorov would re-sign for another season; Cooke did not).
There is a subtle, but not trivial, theme in those signings and that approach. Why commit years and money to players via trade or free-agency signings when the core is still somewhat green? You might be wasting the first year or two of a free agent’s contract, and you might be relinquishing assets too soon for players that would be arriving with a not-yet-ready-for-prime-time core. The flip side of this is that once the core is – or is near – ready for prime time, you can productively add parts that carry longer commitments.
The first inkling that the core might have been near ready was perhaps the signing of Mike Knuble in 2009. He wasn’t a signing to serve as mentor as much as contributor (as might have been the case with Michael Nylander in 2007 for Nicklas Backstrom). He wasn’t a one-dimensional player of limited skill brought on as a protector of sorts (as was Donald Brashear in 2006). He wasn’t an overpayment for a free agent to demonstrate a level of seriousness after a difficult season (as Brian Pothier might have been in 2006). Signing Knuble for two years and $5.6 million represented a substantial commitment to fill a specific need (some offense and an ability to do the dirty work around the net) at the top of the forward lines.
Fast forward to this summer’s activity. The Caps traded for Troy Brouwer, a player with some production similarities to Caps’ forward Brooks Laich. But while Laich was a product of the 2004 selloff (he was obtained for Peter Bondra), Brouwer was obtained for a first round draft pick (essentially a future) to join a team with assets in place. And if Knuble was brought in as the first indication that the core elements were sufficiently ready so that more assets with bigger commitments could be taken on, then the signings of Roman Hamrlik, Jeff Halpern, and Joel Ward serve as stronger evidence that the core is at a point in development where Caps management can make full-year (or in the case of Ward, multi-year) commitments to players from outside, not merely rental bargains at the trading deadline with minimal commitments.
One line of thinking says that you draft for skill and add the other necessities via other means. Another says you build a core, commit to it, then add the pieces you need around it. Different ways of saying similar things. The Caps sold off aging and/or overpaid assets after the 2003 playoff debacle for picks and prospects. That, coupled with the poor performances of the team that remained (plus the luck of a ping-pong ball) allowed them gather up the assets that might make a core – Alex Ovechkin, Mike Green, Nicklas Backstrom, and later (when the club committed much more in terms of years and money for his services) Brooks Laich, who joined Alexander Semin already on board.
That core group had not developed enough early on – that 2006-2007 period – to merit the Caps investing much in terms of free agent signings, nor did it make much sense to trade off picks or prospects for established players. Fans might have wanted it, but it would have been a penny-wise and pound foolish approach. The young guys who would be counted on to make up the core hadn’t really learned anything yet, making those kinds of trades or signings largely a waste of time as the young core players matured.
But this summer, the Caps were very active in the free-agent market, suggesting a new phase in the “rebuild.” And add to that they trading a first round draft pick (even if you think the 2011 draft was comparatively weak) for an established player with a lot of tread left on his tires, and you have an another way of saying the same thing for the Caps – their time is now.
(click for larger version)
Looking at that table above, we can see that there is much more turnover within that group over time. No player shows up in more than two instances of the four time markers we identified. And if you look at the changes from the last game of the 2008 playoffs to today, every spot has been recycled to another player (although one – Brooks Laich – graduated to the core). And in that new group we find today, notice that three of the 13 players came by way of Hershey – Jay Beagle, Jeff Schultz, and Michal Neuvirth. The flip side of that is that nine arrived from other organizations, either by trade (Brouwer, Chimera, Wideman) or by free agency/waivers (Knuble, Ward, Halpern, Hendricks, Hamrlik, Vokoun). Only Marcus Johansson (who someday might be a “core” player) was drafted and did not spend time in North American minor pro leagues.
And it is that imported group that is the more interesting group. Because, in a perverse way, it further supports the notion that the core is built and finished. Over the past four years, the Caps have not done much by way of off-season dealing to fill in behind the core. If you look at that 2008 playoff roster, only Viktor Kozlov, Tom Poti and Donald Brashear were brought in during an off-season (Michael Nylander would be added to that list had he been healthy for that playoff series). Others – Sergei Fedorov, Matt Cooke – were trading deadline deals. They were rentals to whom little financial or time commitment was given (Fedorov would re-sign for another season; Cooke did not).
There is a subtle, but not trivial, theme in those signings and that approach. Why commit years and money to players via trade or free-agency signings when the core is still somewhat green? You might be wasting the first year or two of a free agent’s contract, and you might be relinquishing assets too soon for players that would be arriving with a not-yet-ready-for-prime-time core. The flip side of this is that once the core is – or is near – ready for prime time, you can productively add parts that carry longer commitments.
The first inkling that the core might have been near ready was perhaps the signing of Mike Knuble in 2009. He wasn’t a signing to serve as mentor as much as contributor (as might have been the case with Michael Nylander in 2007 for Nicklas Backstrom). He wasn’t a one-dimensional player of limited skill brought on as a protector of sorts (as was Donald Brashear in 2006). He wasn’t an overpayment for a free agent to demonstrate a level of seriousness after a difficult season (as Brian Pothier might have been in 2006). Signing Knuble for two years and $5.6 million represented a substantial commitment to fill a specific need (some offense and an ability to do the dirty work around the net) at the top of the forward lines.
Fast forward to this summer’s activity. The Caps traded for Troy Brouwer, a player with some production similarities to Caps’ forward Brooks Laich. But while Laich was a product of the 2004 selloff (he was obtained for Peter Bondra), Brouwer was obtained for a first round draft pick (essentially a future) to join a team with assets in place. And if Knuble was brought in as the first indication that the core elements were sufficiently ready so that more assets with bigger commitments could be taken on, then the signings of Roman Hamrlik, Jeff Halpern, and Joel Ward serve as stronger evidence that the core is at a point in development where Caps management can make full-year (or in the case of Ward, multi-year) commitments to players from outside, not merely rental bargains at the trading deadline with minimal commitments.
One line of thinking says that you draft for skill and add the other necessities via other means. Another says you build a core, commit to it, then add the pieces you need around it. Different ways of saying similar things. The Caps sold off aging and/or overpaid assets after the 2003 playoff debacle for picks and prospects. That, coupled with the poor performances of the team that remained (plus the luck of a ping-pong ball) allowed them gather up the assets that might make a core – Alex Ovechkin, Mike Green, Nicklas Backstrom, and later (when the club committed much more in terms of years and money for his services) Brooks Laich, who joined Alexander Semin already on board.
That core group had not developed enough early on – that 2006-2007 period – to merit the Caps investing much in terms of free agent signings, nor did it make much sense to trade off picks or prospects for established players. Fans might have wanted it, but it would have been a penny-wise and pound foolish approach. The young guys who would be counted on to make up the core hadn’t really learned anything yet, making those kinds of trades or signings largely a waste of time as the young core players matured.
But this summer, the Caps were very active in the free-agent market, suggesting a new phase in the “rebuild.” And add to that they trading a first round draft pick (even if you think the 2011 draft was comparatively weak) for an established player with a lot of tread left on his tires, and you have an another way of saying the same thing for the Caps – their time is now.
Wednesday, July 20, 2011
The Rebuild...Renovation, Part I
On Easter Sunday, 2003, the Washington Capitals lost Game 6 of the Eastern Conference Quarterfinal series against the Tampa Bay Lightning. Despite having committed considerable years and money to Jaromir Jagr and Robert Lang, despite having home grown players such as Peter Bondra (his ninth 30-goal season) and Olaf Kolzig (33 wins, a 2.40 GAA) still very productive players, the Caps once more found a way to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. The loss was their fourth in a row in that series after winning the first two games.
And no one was happy at the result, least of all the man in charge, who vented at the fans (“I have to really reconsider the kind of commitment and investment I'm making with this team. I'm not a quitter. ... It was hard to see 14,000 fans.”), at building management (“I don't like the treatment that we're getting from the building. The party's over. To play back-to-back games on Passover and Easter Sunday does not help."), at the refs ("They made a cheap call on too many men on the ice that I don't understand. The third game really hurt us. The penalty on Olie [Kolzig] was the wrong call. Every game at home or every pivotal game was in the hands of the refs.”). It was an unhappiness that might have been uttered by any of those 14,000 fans in attendance or those watching on television.
And thus, the seeds of the remaking of the Washington Capitals were planted – the “rebuild.” By the following spring Jagr, Bondra, and Lang would be gone. The Caps would sink almost to the bottom of the league standings, ship off high-salary players for draft picks and prospects, suffer the growing pains of youth, and eventually rise again to become a playoff team.
We took a look at the rebuild in its “revisited” and “reloaded” versions. The rebuild might be done, but like a homeowner might do after having lived a while in a home, some renovations are in order. And that is what the Caps appear to have been doing this summer. There is already a “core” of players – those to whom the club has committed long term contracts or who might reasonably be receiving that commitment in the near future that has been some years in the making and some years in maturing. And there is also a cohort of players that are the role players, the support players, the character actors that might or might not at some point become “core” players, but more likely are those players who have a window of opportunity with the Caps. It is a window that will close based on diminishing skills or increasing contract demands when their current deals expire, or perhaps as a product of their value as a trading asset to obtain more appropriate skills. Just as in a renovation one doesn’t tear up the foundation, one doesn’t tear up the core of the organization. The Caps have redone the kitchen, renovated the bath, remodeled the family room in a manner of speaking. Looking back at the “prebuild” and the “revisited” and “reloaded” phases of the rebuild, we have something that might look like this with respect to the roster…
We are going to take a look at this in pieces, the first of which is “The core.” The obvious difference is that the core has become younger than that which existed in the "prebuild." In the “prebuild,” we defined the core as Jaromir Jagr (on a high-value/long-term contract), Robert Lang (same), Peter Bondra (an iconic home grown Capital still on a contract paying him $4,750,000), and Olaf Kolzig (another home-grown Cap still on a contract paying him $6,000,000 a year). Each member of this group had reached or passed the age of 30 (Bondra was the oldest, at 34, while Jagr was the youngest, at 30). And on defense, Sergei Gonchar and Brendan Witt might have been considered “core” players. Both were younger than their forward counterparts (28 and 27, respectively), but well into their respective careers, nevertheless (their ninth and eighth seasons, respectively).
Move forward through the revisited and reloaded phases of the rebuild and to the current version of the Caps. The old core was dissolved, and the new one expanded, as we define it, from the 2007 version that included Alex Ovechkin, Alexander Semin, and Mike Green (we would no longer include a 36-year old Olaf Kolzig in that group) to the 2008 version that would add Nicklas Backstrom, thus completing the “Young Guns” group.
Now, after four playoff appearances, the “core” group might also include Brooks Laich, who was signed to a six-year contract after this past season ended. Of these five players—Ovechkin, Backstrom, Semin, Green, and Laich – big things are now expected. And if one might be inclined to think that these five players are youngsters just entering their prime, the fact of the matter is that only Nicklas Backstrom will be younger than 25 on opening night of the 2011-2012 season. More to the point, this quintet now has more than 2,000 combined games of regular season experience (2,034, to be exact) and 184 games of playoff experience. Green is the only one of the five to have missed any of the 37 playoff games the Caps played over the past four seasons, and he missed but one.
However, each of these five players saw their individual numbers drop in the 2010-2011 season from the previous season (goals, assists, points, plus-minus):
Not that individual numbers are the be-all and end-all of player performance, and there were instances of mitigating factors (Green missing 33 games, the Caps shifting their team emphasis from pressing offense to paying more attention to defensive matters). But combined, this group recorded 65 fewer goals than in the 2009-2010 season, accounting for almost 70 percent of the decrease in goals (94) scored from the 2009-2010 season. And while there are technical reasons (too many defensive zone starts for the top line, for example) that would help explain the drop, they don’t do enough to explain the decline in power play production. These five players saw their combined power play goals scored cut more than half, from 54 in 2009-2010 to 26 in 2010-2011. The drop of 28 power play goals explains almost all of the total drop of 33 power play goals from 2009-2010 to 2010-2011. Not surprising, since these five players led the Caps in power play time on ice in each of the past two seasons.
But as we said, individual numbers are not everything. They have to be the players who, either by example or by personality, have to lead this team to where they need to go. George McPhee was rather blunt about it recently in speaking of the “Young Guns”:
How they perform individually – reflected in their numbers – will be an indicator of how well they might lead by example, but there will be other things to watch for. The degree to which other players – youngsters like John Carlson or Marcus Johansson – take their cues from how hard these core players work on and off the ice, the extent to which they play – and play well – when hurt (as opposed to “injured”), how they deal with adversity both on the ice (by ramping up their performance) and off (the degree to which they are accountable as leaders for the team’s performance).
George McPhee and his staff, with the personnel moves they made this summer, sent a strong signal to these players that the club has entered a new phase in its rebuild, a more urgent one. Signing a 35-year old Tomas Vokoun, a 37-year old Roman Hamrlik, and a 35-year old Jeff Halpern fairly shouts, “win now.” That is a signal that the core, years in building, is now experienced enough that they need to think of this as their team. They are a group that should no longer need the “training wheels” of leadership that a Fedorov or an Arnott provided. They are far enough along so that the team can add a player such as a Vokoun or a Halpern for a year as that last missing piece. It is a clear signal that all the building of the core is done – their time is now.
And no one was happy at the result, least of all the man in charge, who vented at the fans (“I have to really reconsider the kind of commitment and investment I'm making with this team. I'm not a quitter. ... It was hard to see 14,000 fans.”), at building management (“I don't like the treatment that we're getting from the building. The party's over. To play back-to-back games on Passover and Easter Sunday does not help."), at the refs ("They made a cheap call on too many men on the ice that I don't understand. The third game really hurt us. The penalty on Olie [Kolzig] was the wrong call. Every game at home or every pivotal game was in the hands of the refs.”). It was an unhappiness that might have been uttered by any of those 14,000 fans in attendance or those watching on television.
And thus, the seeds of the remaking of the Washington Capitals were planted – the “rebuild.” By the following spring Jagr, Bondra, and Lang would be gone. The Caps would sink almost to the bottom of the league standings, ship off high-salary players for draft picks and prospects, suffer the growing pains of youth, and eventually rise again to become a playoff team.
We took a look at the rebuild in its “revisited” and “reloaded” versions. The rebuild might be done, but like a homeowner might do after having lived a while in a home, some renovations are in order. And that is what the Caps appear to have been doing this summer. There is already a “core” of players – those to whom the club has committed long term contracts or who might reasonably be receiving that commitment in the near future that has been some years in the making and some years in maturing. And there is also a cohort of players that are the role players, the support players, the character actors that might or might not at some point become “core” players, but more likely are those players who have a window of opportunity with the Caps. It is a window that will close based on diminishing skills or increasing contract demands when their current deals expire, or perhaps as a product of their value as a trading asset to obtain more appropriate skills. Just as in a renovation one doesn’t tear up the foundation, one doesn’t tear up the core of the organization. The Caps have redone the kitchen, renovated the bath, remodeled the family room in a manner of speaking. Looking back at the “prebuild” and the “revisited” and “reloaded” phases of the rebuild, we have something that might look like this with respect to the roster…
(click for larger version)
We are going to take a look at this in pieces, the first of which is “The core.” The obvious difference is that the core has become younger than that which existed in the "prebuild." In the “prebuild,” we defined the core as Jaromir Jagr (on a high-value/long-term contract), Robert Lang (same), Peter Bondra (an iconic home grown Capital still on a contract paying him $4,750,000), and Olaf Kolzig (another home-grown Cap still on a contract paying him $6,000,000 a year). Each member of this group had reached or passed the age of 30 (Bondra was the oldest, at 34, while Jagr was the youngest, at 30). And on defense, Sergei Gonchar and Brendan Witt might have been considered “core” players. Both were younger than their forward counterparts (28 and 27, respectively), but well into their respective careers, nevertheless (their ninth and eighth seasons, respectively).
Move forward through the revisited and reloaded phases of the rebuild and to the current version of the Caps. The old core was dissolved, and the new one expanded, as we define it, from the 2007 version that included Alex Ovechkin, Alexander Semin, and Mike Green (we would no longer include a 36-year old Olaf Kolzig in that group) to the 2008 version that would add Nicklas Backstrom, thus completing the “Young Guns” group.
Now, after four playoff appearances, the “core” group might also include Brooks Laich, who was signed to a six-year contract after this past season ended. Of these five players—Ovechkin, Backstrom, Semin, Green, and Laich – big things are now expected. And if one might be inclined to think that these five players are youngsters just entering their prime, the fact of the matter is that only Nicklas Backstrom will be younger than 25 on opening night of the 2011-2012 season. More to the point, this quintet now has more than 2,000 combined games of regular season experience (2,034, to be exact) and 184 games of playoff experience. Green is the only one of the five to have missed any of the 37 playoff games the Caps played over the past four seasons, and he missed but one.
However, each of these five players saw their individual numbers drop in the 2010-2011 season from the previous season (goals, assists, points, plus-minus):
Not that individual numbers are the be-all and end-all of player performance, and there were instances of mitigating factors (Green missing 33 games, the Caps shifting their team emphasis from pressing offense to paying more attention to defensive matters). But combined, this group recorded 65 fewer goals than in the 2009-2010 season, accounting for almost 70 percent of the decrease in goals (94) scored from the 2009-2010 season. And while there are technical reasons (too many defensive zone starts for the top line, for example) that would help explain the drop, they don’t do enough to explain the decline in power play production. These five players saw their combined power play goals scored cut more than half, from 54 in 2009-2010 to 26 in 2010-2011. The drop of 28 power play goals explains almost all of the total drop of 33 power play goals from 2009-2010 to 2010-2011. Not surprising, since these five players led the Caps in power play time on ice in each of the past two seasons.
But as we said, individual numbers are not everything. They have to be the players who, either by example or by personality, have to lead this team to where they need to go. George McPhee was rather blunt about it recently in speaking of the “Young Guns”:
"They are difference-makers, and if they are really on top of their games and committed and playing well, then this team will have success. The message to them this summer has been, 'It is time for you guys to really take over. You're talented, you can be a difference-maker, but now it is time to lead. We've had guys like (Sergei) Fedorov in and (Jason) Arnott, but it is your turn. You're old enough, you're experienced enough now to really take over and lead.'"
How they perform individually – reflected in their numbers – will be an indicator of how well they might lead by example, but there will be other things to watch for. The degree to which other players – youngsters like John Carlson or Marcus Johansson – take their cues from how hard these core players work on and off the ice, the extent to which they play – and play well – when hurt (as opposed to “injured”), how they deal with adversity both on the ice (by ramping up their performance) and off (the degree to which they are accountable as leaders for the team’s performance).
George McPhee and his staff, with the personnel moves they made this summer, sent a strong signal to these players that the club has entered a new phase in its rebuild, a more urgent one. Signing a 35-year old Tomas Vokoun, a 37-year old Roman Hamrlik, and a 35-year old Jeff Halpern fairly shouts, “win now.” That is a signal that the core, years in building, is now experienced enough that they need to think of this as their team. They are a group that should no longer need the “training wheels” of leadership that a Fedorov or an Arnott provided. They are far enough along so that the team can add a player such as a Vokoun or a Halpern for a year as that last missing piece. It is a clear signal that all the building of the core is done – their time is now.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)